How do Americans evaluate potential U.S. Supreme Court candidates? Using a novel, two-part conjoint experiment, I show that respondents put high importance on the political leanings of potential Court candidates, a finding in contrast with the scholarly view that the public views the Court as different from other, more political institutions. Indeed, when respondents are given information about a nominee's partisan leanings they rely extensively on that information in deciding whether to support the candidate, whether they trust the candidate, and whether they find the candidate qualified. By contrast, when partisan information is withheld, respondents appear to use other kinds of signals, such as race, in order to fill in the gaps. Those who are most knowledgeable about the Court are most influenced by these partisan signals, providing further support for the importance of political heuristics. The results suggest that the public's evaluation of judicial nominees is more in line with how it evaluates other political actors. They also suggest that even candidates with excellent qualifications need not garner bipartisan public support.
Introduction
legitimacy being the most likely to value professional characteristics as opposed to partisan considerations. This leads to a second implication of the judiciousness model, which is that respondents with high levels of legitimacy or knowledge will be most likely to rely on objective qualifications characteristics in evaluating candidates and least likely to rely on candidates' partisan positioning. Furthermore, we would expect to see judiciousness matter more for a qualifications-oriented evaluation, a point I leverage below.
Viewing Nominees via Partisan Proximity
In contrast, a widely accepted scholarly view outside of the courts literature is that people form their voting and policy preferences in large part via their partisan affiliation (Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee, 1954; Campbell, Gurin and Miller, 1954; Downs, 1957; Angus et al., 1966; Bartels, 2002a,b; Carsey and Layman, 2006; Zaller, 1992; Gerber and Huber, 2009) . As the canonical work of Angus et al. (1966, Chapter 6) notes, "identification with a party raises a perceptual screen through which the individual tends to see what is favorable to his partisan orientation" (Angus et al., 1966, p. 133 ).
For Stokes, "the affairs of government are remote and complex, " and, " [i] n this dilemma, having the party symbol stamped on certain candidates...is of great psychological convenience" to members of the public (Stokes, 1962, p. 690) . More recently, Bartels (2002a) finds that "party identification is a pervasive dynamic force shaping citizens' perceptions of, and reactions to, the political world. " Others have found that partisan signals are a useful heuristic in deciding which candidates or policies to support (Lodge and Hamill, 1986; Rahn, 1993) . To sum, the literature supports the notion that people support policies and politicians whose partisanship aligns with their own.
This view, dominant in other areas of American politics research, has influenced a growing literature on the Court. Caldeira and Gibson (1992) , for example, find no connection between support for policy preferences and diffuse support for the Court, but they do find that "broad political values" (e.g., support for "democratic norms") predict support. One step further, Hetherington and Smith (2007) find that conservatives are less supportive of the Court than are liberals, arguing that this may be artifact of a time when the Court was more liberal. Bartels and Johnston (2013) and Johnston, Hillygus and Bartels (2014) extend this by arguing that the public views Court decisions through a subjective ideological lens, with ideological proximity being a strong determinant of feelings of legitimacy. Christenson and Glick (2015) and Christenson and Glick (2014) find that the public has weakened feelings of legitimacy toward the Court when its rulings contradict respondents' own political views. 2 Looking at confirmations, Gimpel and Wolpert (1996) examine controversial nominations and find that evaluations of candidates correlate with both respondents' partisanship and with evaluations of the appointing Presidents. Similarly, Bartels and Johnston (2012) develop a theory of "political reinforcement, " arguing that individuals perceiving the Court as "just another political institution" will evaluate nominees in terms of their ideological positions. For purposes of the experiment to follow, the hypothesis stemming from this is that respondents evaluate nominees by considering their political positions in tandem with their own. That is, respondents who are politically distant from a nominee will be less likely to support the nominee, to think that he or she is qualified, and to trust the nominee to reach the correct decisions compared to respondents who are co-partisans or politically proximate.
Interaction with Knowledge. Such patterns may vary according to respondents' familiarity with the Court. For example, the theory of judiciousness would predict that more knowledgeable individuals have stronger feelings of legitimacy, therefore suggesting a weakened reliance on partisan cues. On the other hand, Bartels and Johnston (2012) find that respondents who are more knowledgeable about the Court are the most likely to view its subsequent rulings in partisan terms. As they note, this finding is in line with a broader political psychology literature noting that more knowledgeable people tend to be those for whom partisanship matters the most (Carpini Delli and Keeter, 1997; Sniderman, Tetlock and Brody, 1993; Zaller, 1992; Goren, 2004) .) For example, Zaller's analysis of Presidential candidates finds that "individual differences in political awareness interact with partisanship and ideology in the 2 As noted above, a recurring theme in many of these studies is whether legitimacy should be construed as an explanatory variable (as is done in Gibson and Caldeira (2009b) ) or as an outcome variable (as is done in Johnston, Hillygus and Bartels (2014) ). Because the interest here is in the relative importance of legitimacy versus political beliefs in explaining support or trust in a nominee, I examine legitimacy as an explanatory variable. This is consistent with Gibson and Caldeira (2009b) . assessment of presidential character. Among less aware citizens, partisanship has less of an effect; among the highly informed, the effect of partisanship is more pronounced" (Zaller, 1992, p. 297) . This is also consistent with the heuristics literature; for example, as Sniderman, Tetlock and Brody (1993, p. 24) note, the "comparative advantage [of the more knowledgeable] is not that they have a stupendous amount of knowledge, but that they know how to get the most out of the knowledge they do possess. " Looking at the Court, these papers would predict that more knowledgeable individuals may be those who have "received" the argument that the politics of the individual Justices predict eventual rulings. This suggests a hypothesis in contradiction with that implied by the judiciousness hypothesis, which is that increased knowledge about the Supreme Court will correlate with increased reliance on partisan cues.
Viewing Nominees via Political Signaling
A problem with the political agreement hypothesis is, however, is that the public frequently lacks accurate signals about the political leanings of nominees. The public surely gleans information about the political leanings of candidates from the identity of the appointing President; however, as has been argued by several scholars, this leaves the public with a weak sense of a candidate's potential politics or directionality in terms of eventual rulings (Kagan, 1995; Post and Siegel, 2006) , with the identity of the President often being an inaccurate signal (e.g., Earl Warren, Sandra Day O'Connor).
If the political agreement hypothesis is persuasive, then, in the absence of clear political signals, the public would be left without information with which to evaluate nominees. These concerns suggest an extension of the political agreement theory, which builds on existing literature in political psychology. This hypothesis, which I call political searching predicts that when political positioning is missing, respondents will search for other cues that could predict political leanings. This is a concept similar to the use of heuristics (e.g., Sniderman, Tetlock and Brody, 1993; Lupia, 1994; Popkin, 1994) , in which respondents look for cues-oftentimes in the form of party identification-to predict eventual decision making (Lodge and Hamill, 1986; Rahn, 1993) . As several papers have noted Lau and Redlawsk (2001); Popkin (1994) , these cues could include ostensibly non-political characteristics such as candidate appearance, including race or gender. For example, using hypothetical candidate profiles, (McDermott, 1998) documents that both gender and race act as informational cues in lowinformation elections. Specifically, she finds that, in the absence of clear political cues, liberals and Democrats are more likely to support female and African Americans.
Similar to McDermott (1998) , the mechanism underlying political searching operates in the context of missing (or low) information-which more closely mimics the information environment surrounding Supreme Court nominations. Under this theory of political searching, in the absence of partisan cues, respondents will look to other candidate characteristics that could correlate with political leanings. This implies that the importance of potential cues should vary from Democrats to Republicans. For Democrats, the absence of partisan signals might push them to consider race or gender-both of which have been documented as influencing judicial decision making (e.g., Peresie, 2005; Scherer, 2004; McDermott, 1998) . For Republicans, the absence of clear partisan signals may encourage them to look for judges who are male, white, or of a particular religious background (Yarnold, 2000) . For that reason, and to further account for partisan differences among respondents, many of the analysis below subset respondents by self-reported partisanship.
Viewing Nominees via Descriptive Connections
The last theory I consider is that demographic characteristics could influence how much respondents support a particular candidate. For example, consistent with a large literature on implicit bias, studies have shown that minority and female judicial candidates receive lower professional ratings, despite having comparable professional backgrounds (Gill, Lazos and Waters, 2011) . Thus, one link is perhaps that implicit bias leads respondents to view minority (or female) nominees as less fit. Another possible link is that some respondents may have an affinity with candidates who resemble them descriptively, a finding consistent with Scherer and Curry (2010) . I generalize these into a flexible hypothesis that respondent support might vary according to the race or gender of the nominee (and of the respondent).
Description of the Conjoint Experimental Design
I explore these theories via a conjoint experiment. Conjoint designs have been used extensively in marketing to study consumer preferences (Green and Rao, 1971; Green, Krieger and Wind, 2001) and have been increasingly used in political science (Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto, 2014) .
The methodology operates by presenting respondents with different hypothetical judicial profiles that rotate through a random set of professional and educational characteristics. Not only is this design useful for assessing the effect of any one characteristic on respondent opinion (Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto, 2014) , but the presentation of judicial profiles also means that the design is well suited for studying Court nominations. Indeed, candidates are often presented to the public not on the basis of likely rulings, which candidates generally refuse to discuss, but mostly on the basis of personal characteristics and professional experience-a strategy used by the supporters of Alito, Sonia Sotomayor, Garland, and others. For example, in presenting Judge Garland to the public in 2016, Barack Obama devoted the majority of his remarks to detailing Garland's resume, including his Ivy league education and experience as a federal judge.
The survey was conducted in December of 2013, with respondents recruited by Survey Sampling International (SSI), which employs online opt-in panels. The 15-minute survey involved 1,650 U.S. adults non-probabilistically sampled so as to resemble the U.S. population across age, gender, race or ethnicity, and geography. 3 The final number of respondents (n = 1, 650) represents all who finished the survey. 4 All questions were randomly ordered within randomly ordered blocks, with the exception of the questions pertaining to knowledge and feelings of legitimacy, which came at the beginning of the survey to avoid mismeasurement. Where appropriate, all answer categories were randomly ordered.
Conjoint Design. Following Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto (2014) , each respondent was presented with six "candidate" profiles (Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto, 2014) . 5 In order to test the political agreement and political searching theories, a random half of respondents were shown partisan information in these conjoint profiles (n = 886) and half were not (n = 764). Each profile thus contained eight (or seven) characteristics whose values were randomly assigned and ordered, with the random order assuring no profile order effect.
With this randomized design, respondents were exposed to one of 16,000 potential combinations with equal probability. 6 The characteristics were as follows:
• Demographic -Age: 30-40, 40-50, 50-60, 60-70, or (Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto, 2014) , I choose to present the respondents with one profile. This choice was driven by the actual judicial nominations landscape, in which one person is nominated at a time. 6 Despite the fact that some combinations would appear less frequently in the real candidate population, this is no bar to the applicability of the research design nor a threat to the inferences (Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto, 2014) . 7 The Top 14 schools, or "T14, " have historically been known as the most elite of all U.S. law schools, and their composition has not varied since rankings have been kept. By contrast, the composition of the top five schools, or even the top three, has significantly varied throughout the past 25 years. via the covariate balance in the Appendix), but, to assuage these concerns, I control for partisanship in many of the analyses below.
Measures of knowledge about the Supreme Court and of legitimacy. Objective knowledge about the Court influences subsequent views about the Court (e.g, Gibson, 2007; Gibson and Caldeira, 2009c) . The survey thus included six questions to assess baseline knowledge. 8 (Full question wording is presented in the Appendix.) As shown by Table 2 , a majority of respondents are able to identify the fact that Justices are appointed by the President (77%), serve life terms (68%), and have the final say about Constitutional matters (67%). Knowledge lessens once the questions turn to current topics.
For example, only 24% of respondents correctly identify the most recent nominee at the time of the survey.
In addition, following Gibson, Caldeira and Spence (2003) , five questions addressed respondents' feelings of legitimacy toward the Court. Table 4 : Ordered logit coefficients. Outcomes are higher values of (1) support, (2) attitudes on qualification, and (3) trust. Sample includes all respondents receiving partisan prompts (n = 886). SEs clustered at respondent level.
Results among co-partisans. Table 4 presents the main results and includes a dummy variable representing whether the hypothetical candidates' partisanship matched the respondents' . Thus, this "Co-Partisan" variable is "1" if a Republican respondent was shown the profile of a hypothetical candidate who "leaned" or was "strongly" Republican and "0" for a candidate "leaning" Democrat or
Democrat. The Table shows the clear strength of co-partisanship. Across the "support" and "trust"
questions it is the single most important factor predicting respondent opinions; for the "qualifications" question, it is only second to having a candidate graduate outside of the Top 100 law schools in predictive importance.
In terms of substantive probability differences, Figure 1 demonstrates the change in probability associated with showing the respondent a profile that is not co-partisan versus a profile that is copartisan. As the Figure shows , there is a significant increase in the probability that a respondent will strongly support, think qualified, or trust a candidate when that candidate is a co-partisan as opposed to not. For strong support, this co-partisan bump is approximately 10 percentage points; for strong trust, it is around eight percentage points. For thinking candidate highly qualified, the bump is slightly lower, at seven percentage points. All of the co-partisan coefficients and differences are significant at the 1% level. In terms of the conceptual framework, this provides strong support for the political agreement and political searching theories.
By contrast, Table 4 presents weaker evidence for the theory of "judiciousness. " (Additional tests of the judiciousness theory are in Section 5.) Candidates who have previous law clerkships are favored, particularly for the qualifications question; however, the magnitude is about half of the co-partisan effect. Respondents also have lukewarm responses to educational achievement, particularly for the support question; so long as the candidate does not graduate outside of the Top 100 schools, then respondents are statistically indifferent about law school rank. Other "judiciousness" characteristics show no clear pattern. These findings suggest that, above a minimum bar, pedigree may be a weaker predictor of whether a respondent will eventually support or trust a candidate than partisanship.
Importantly, Table 4 shows differences between whether respondents "support" or "trust" the candidate versus whether they think the candidate is qualified. For example, religious minority status (for example, a candidate being Mormon) appears to influence respondents' overall levels of support or trust, but makes less of a difference for attitudes on qualifications. In addition, the party effect is the smallest for the qualifications questions. The implication, discussed further below, is that focusing exclusively on qualifications (as is often done) could mask differences in levels of support or trust, and the latter may be more important for respondent preferences. However, partisanship still matters to whether respondents believe candidates to be qualified.
Here as in elsewhere, the data show little support for a theory resting on descriptive characteristics. For those candidates identified as racial or ethnic minorities, the results show several precisely estimated 0's. There is, by contrast, some support for a theory involving female candidates; however, the effect is fairly small (compared to co-partisanship) and operates in a positive direction-contrary to the implicit bias argument. Further analyses, not shown, also show no meaningful findings regarding interactions between these characteristics and corresponding respondent characteristics.
Results by party.
To further examine the relationship between co-partisanship and candidate support, I subset respondents into Democrats and Republicans. These results are presented in Table 5 , which shows that co-partisanship continues to be by far the most important predictor of respondent attitudes. For example, consider the support question (Columns 1 and 2). For Republican respondents, having a candidate who "leans" or is "strongly" Democrat makes them less likely to support the candidate, a drop that is significant at the 1% level. Contrariwise, having a candidate identified as a strong Republican makes them more likely to support the candidate, a relationship that is significant at the 5% level. These patterns are for the most part consistent across the different kinds of questions Figure 1: Predicted probability changes associated with a candidate going from a non-copartisan to a co-partisan, with outcomes being (1) support, (2) beliefs about qualifications, and (3) trust. Probabilities generated from ordered logit specifications with SEs calculated by bootstrapping on respondent.
Substantively in line with the previous analyses, Table 5 suggests a relative unimportance of those variables that capture judiciousness. For example, moving from a Top 14 school to a school ranked in the 15-25 range makes no discernible difference across respondent subsets. 10 Previous judicial experience was a positive predictor before but, as Table 5 shows, disaggregating by respondent partisanship lessen its importance across most subsets and questions. In addition, the results suggest that work experience is viewed primarily through a partisan lens: Democrats, for example, appear to think that law professors and public defenders are more qualified than attorneys in private practice. (However, these analyses have less power than the analyses in Table 4 because they subset by respondents, meaning that small treatment effects may not be detected.) Perhaps the strongest case for judiciousness concerns the law clerk variable; among many of the subsets, respondents prefer candidates with previous clerkships as opposed to those without. Even so, the effect size is smaller than the partisanship effects across all questions.
Consistent with Table 4 , candidate race presents mixed findings. Looking at Republicans, there appears to be a negative relationship between a candidate being African American and support or trustworthiness; tellingly, there is no similar negative relationship when it comes to qualifications.
Looking at gender, however, the previous findings showing increased support and trust do not hold.
Taken together, these provide no consistent support for a theory based on descriptive representation.
I therefore set this explanation aside for the rest of the analyses.
Examining Judiciousness More Closely
As noted above, the theory of judiciousness predicts those respondents with the strongest pre-existing legitimacy would be those least influenced by partisan cues and most influenced by prestigious professional characteristics (Gibson and Caldeira, 2009b) . We may also expect that, conditional on strong candidate qualifications, partisan cues would matter little (Gibson and Caldeira, 2009b Table 6 : Ordered logit coefficients. Outcomes are higher values of (1) support, (2) attitudes on qualification, and (3) trust. Sample includes all respondents receiving partisan prompts (n = 886). Models (1), (2), and (3) include interactions between co-partisanship and high legitimacy; models (4), (5), and (6) include interactions between co-partisanship and high levels of knowledge. Other characteristics from conjoint included in model but not shown. SEs clustered at respondent level.
Interaction between Legitimacy and Knowledge and Co-Partisanship. To test whether the influence of candidate partisanship depends on pre-existing levels of legitimacy and knowledge, I interact whether the respondent viewed a co-partisan profile with respondents' (1) feelings of legitimacy and (2) objective knowledge. For judiciousness to be persuasive, we would expect a negative interactionthat is, as respondents' legitimacy (or knowledge) increases, the importance of co-partisanship ought to weaken. At its weakest, the judiciousness model would predict no positive interaction.
In Table 6 , I use a dummy variable for whether the respondent expressed high levels of legitimacy (answering either 4 or 5 of the legitimacy questions in a direction indicating increased legitimacy) or knowledge (answering either 5 or 6 of the knowledge questions correctly). As Table 6 shows, however, there is limited support for the judiciousness hypothesis. Consider the legitimacy interaction, presented in Columns (1), (2), and (3). The interaction between legitimacy and co-partisan is positive and significant (at the 10% level) in at least one instance-when considering support. 11 In the other analyses, Columns (2) and (3), the interaction is not significant, which suggests that the importance of co-partisanship does not vary according to pre-existing feelings of legitimacy. Figure 2 further presents these results graphically, displaying the predicted probability changes associated with the co-partisanship relationship, both for the high-legitimacy and for low-legitimacy respondents. At their weakest, the findings in Table 6 and Figure 2 suggest that we cannot eliminate the possibility that those who believe strongly in the Court's institutional legitimacy are no more likely to depart from a partisan-oriented world view than those who have lower feelings of legitimacy, counter to the judiciousness theory. I provide additional evidence of this in Section 6, which compares those who were shown the partisan prompt with those who were not.
Even less consistent with the judiciousness theory are the analyses regarding respondent knowledge, presented in Columns (4), (5), and (6) of Table 6 . Consider the lower-order knowledge term for the "support" and "trust" outcomes. The negative coefficient suggests that higher-knowledge respondents are more likely to have a lower opinion of a cross-party candidate than those with little knowledge. In addition, the interaction term between high knowledge and the hypothetical candidate being respondents, knowing that the candidate is a co-partisan results in an increased probability that they will "support" the candidate of around 15 percentage points; for low-knowledge respondents, it is only around 8 percentage points.
Conditioning on High Quality Candidates. Another implication of the judiciousness model is that the stronger the qualifications of the candidate, the more partisan considerations will fade (Gibson and Caldeira, 2009b) . To explore this, I subset the conjoint profiles to those in which the hypothetical candidate was identified as (1) a former law clerk and (2) a graduate of a Top 14 law school. These determinants (particularly clerkship) were among the most important in the analyses in Tables 4 and   5 , suggesting that these could represent the more "judicious" of the characteristics.
The results of analyses looking at such "highly qualified" hypothetical profiles is presented in Figure 2: Predicted probabilities changes associated with a candidate going from a non-copartisan to a co-partisan. Outcomes are respondent's feelings of (1) overall level of support, (2) sentiments on level of qualification, and (3) how much they would trust the potential candidate. Estimates generated via an ordered logit model. SEs calculated by bootstrapping on respondent. Figure 3: Predicted probabilities changes associated with a candidate going from a non-copartisan to a co-partisan. Outcomes are respondent's feelings of (1) overall level of support, (2) sentiments on level of qualification, and (3) how much they would trust the potential candidate. Estimates generated via an ordered logit model. SEs calculated by bootstrapping on respondent. Table 7 : Ordered logit coefficients. Outcomes are higher values of (1) support, (2) attitudes on qualification, and (3) trust. Sample includes all respondents receiving partisan prompts (n = 886). Models (1), (3), and (3) include all conjoint profiles; models (2), (4), and (6) include only "highly qualified" conjoint profiles. Other characteristics from conjoint included in model but not shown. SEs clustered at respondent level. 
Effect of Withholding Partisan Cues
As noted, judicial candidates are often presented to the public primarily through their professional characteristics and personal experience, as opposed through their partisan or policy beliefs (beyond the identity of the appointing President, which may be a noisy signal). Thus, a comparison group of respondents (n = 764), randomly chosen, were shown conjoint profiles with partisan cues withheld.
This complements the research design in two ways. First, withholding partisan cues tests whether respondents reach for other cues in the absence of partisan information (e.g., political searching versus political agreement). Second, it allows the explicit comparison with and without partisan information for individuals with high levels of legitimacy and knowledge. This provides further testing of the judiciousness versus political agreement and political searching models. Table 8 : Ordered logit coefficients. Outcomes are higher values of (1) support, (2) attitudes on qualification, and (3) trust. Sample includes all respondents not receiving partisan prompts (n = 764). Models (1), (3), and (3) include all Republican respondents; models (2), (4), and (6) can is linked with an increase in support, belief in qualifications, and trust, statistically significant at the 5% or 10% levels-unlike its non-significance in the previous analyses, where partisan information as included. Another example is religion. For Democrats, the predictive power of a candidate being a Mormon is statistically indistinguishable from zero when partisan cues are provided. However, when they are withheld, there is a negative effect of the candidate being Mormon on whether the respondent will trust him or her to reach the "correct" decision. Again, this suggests a different strategy in terms of how respondents respond to information, depending on whether partisan cues are provided. For Democrats, other patterns include an increased importance of education, a candidate being Hispanic or Latino/a (for trust), and a candidate being Asian American (also for trust). We also see an increased importance played by gender, with significance across two of the outcomes (qualifications and trust) and positive, although narrowly insignificant, results across the third (support).
These findings provide evidence that different cues rise in importance depending on the information environment-support for a political searching theory.
Testing differences between partisan and non-partisan cues. To formally test these differences, I
included all 1,650 respondents-both those who had received the partisan cues and those that had not-into one analysis. I then included a dummy variable for whether the partisan variable had been withheld. By interacting this dummy variable with the various treatment conditions, I therefore test whether the importance of the various characteristics vary according to whether the partisan prompt was provided or withheld. Tables 5 and 8 .) As a summary of this information, "Decrease" indicates that withholding the partisan prompt leads that characteristic to predict less enthusiasm while "Increase" indicates that withholding the partisan prompt leads that characteristic to predict greater enthusiasm.
(with regard to overall support). The substantive interpretation is therefore that Democratic respondents are more likely to support an African-American candidate when partisan information about that candidate is withheld. Combined with the fact that the coefficient on the African American variable is positive among groups not receiving the partisan prompt (Table 8) and not significant among those receiving the partisan prompt (Table 5) , this leads to a key point: Democrats place positive weight on a candidate being African American only in the absence of partisan cues-that is, possibly because it appears to signal a more Democratic-oriented leaning.
Other examples also indicate possible searching for partisan cues. For example, the effect of a candidate being identified as female also varies depending on whether partisan information is also provided. For Republicans, the interaction with partisanship is negative within the question on trust (and also on qualifications), meaning that withholding partisan information makes Republicans less likely to think that female candidates would be trusted to reach the correct decision. Given existing scholarship on how female judges may vote or influence their colleagues in a more progressive direction on gender-related questions (e.g., Boyd, Epstein and Martin, 2010; Peresie, 2005) , such behavior is rational. Another interesting pattern concerns the status of elected politicians. When partisan information is withheld, Democrats are more skeptical of candidates identified as former politicians, perhaps a rational response to the fact that this could indicate a higher probability that the candidate in question is a Republican compared to the average judicial candidate (Bonica and Sen, 2016) . With regard to clerkship experience, among the more important "judiciousness" variables, for Democrats, withholding the partisan cue makes clerkships more important in some instances. This could suggest a potential belief that clerkships are a signal of of liberalism-echoing the fact that affiliates of top law programs tend to be more liberal than the overall population of attorneys (Bonica, Chilton and Sen, 2015) . Note that an alternative interpretation is that this last finding could suggest that, if partisanship is not primed by the study (as is the case among those respondents not receiving the partisan prompt), then respondents are turning to qualifications (such as clerkships) as the primary cues for making their judgments. This explanation, however, would not explain the patterns seen for female judges or for African American judges.
Two patterns are, on the surface, puzzling: public defenders and non-profit attorneys. Democrats appear to devalue these traits when partisan information is withheld, at least with regard to beliefs about qualification. This is surprising, since both traits could be good proxies for liberal political lean- Table 10 : Ordered logit coefficients. Outcomes are higher values of (1) support, (2) attitudes on qualification, and (3) trust. Sample includes all respondents (n = 1,650). Models (1), (2), and (3) include an interaction between whether the respondent received the partisan information and legitimacy; models (4), (5), and (6) do the same for high levels of knowledge. Other characteristics from conjoint included in model but not shown. SEs clustered at respondent level.
Interactions with Legitimacy.
As a last check of the judiciousness theory, I interact whether the partisan treatment was withheld with (1) high legitimacy and (2) high knowledge. This has the effect of assessing whether effects associated with the partisan cue vary according to respondents' preexisting levels of legitimacy or knowledge. A strong version of the judiciousness theory would predict a positive interaction, which would suggest that those with high levels of legitimacy or knowledge are more enthusiastic in the absence of such cues (or, alternatively, that they are "turned off " when receiving partisan cues). These results are presented in Table 10 . The Table shows no interactive effect associated with legitimacy or knowledge. Substantively, this means we are unable to rule out that that the effect of receiving partisan information does not vary by levels of legitimacy or knowledgeperhaps additional suggestive evidence against the judiciousness theory.
Discussion: What Explains Public Responses to Supreme Court Candidates?
Given these results, how do members of the public evaluate, and come to support, Supreme Court candidates? These results suggest that partisan proximity is the most important characteristic in how these respondents approach nominees. Across the political spectrum, respondents prefer candidates 29 closer to themselves politically and oppose candidates who differ. This is the case even looking at highly qualified candidates, for whom deference based on judiciousness should be highest, and also for respondents with high levels of legitimacy and knowledge about the Court. This is also the case when looking at public evaluations of support, trust, and qualifications (despite the fact that there are differences across these, noted below). Indeed, the fact that partisanship has an impact on how qualified respondents believe candidates to be suggested that motivated reasoning might play a role in these sorts of evaluations. That is, that respondents assess nominees primarily on the basis of ideological agreement and then rationalize and may justify that support adjusting their beliefs about the nominees' qualifications.
This analysis also suggests that the information environment surrounding nominations plays an important role. Members of the public might not know the partisan leanings of Supreme Court nominees as well as they do members of Congress or presidential candidates. Moreover, presidents, perhaps trying to avoid partisan fighting, tend to focus on personal characteristics and professional experiences (as opposed to partisanship) in promoting Supreme Court nominees. However, when partisan cues are withheld in this fashion, this analysis suggests that other factors appear to rise in importance. Indeed, when cues about partisanship are withheld, a candidate's gender or race may become salient. These findings are consistent with a vast literature in political psychology on heuristics and information short-cuts (e.g., Sniderman, Tetlock and Brody, 1993) ; they are also consistent with research showing that people assume that women and minorities may be more liberal and Democratic (McDermott, 1998) . In sum, looking at other characteristics is a reasonable strategy for people who know that politics matter predicting how Justices will vote, but lack reliable information. These findings also suggest that, even though executives and political actors may attempt to mute partisan signals in the introduction of Supreme Court candidates, a person's partisan leanings will still serve as an important lens through which he or she will evaluate nominees.
The results also question the possibility that judiciousness is the primary factor in shaping public support or opposition to Court candidates, although more research is needed. Across all analyses, characteristics associated with "judiciousness" have mixed relationships with attitudes, particularly when it comes to the key questions of support and trust. However, the results also leave open the possibility that other judiciousness characteristics, not included in this conjoint, may predict respondent evaluations, and future research should address whether considerations such as years of experience, professional ratings, or peer evaluations might influence public perceptions. In addition, even these results suggest some exceptions: for example, a candidate being a former law clerk is positively associated with some evaluations, while a candidate graduating from a law school ranked outside of the top 100 is associated negatively with evaluations. However, the findings here ultimately suggest that, above a certain bar, partisanship may be a more salient consideration. That is, between judiciousness (as measured here) and partisan considerations, partisanship is by far more important.
In addition, the predictive importance of partisanship strengthens when looking at respondents with the highest levels of legitimacy and knowledge. This is a finding contrary to the literature on judiciousness, which would predict that these individuals should be the least reliant on political signals. Instead, this is a finding more in line with the existing literature in political psychology, which suggests that partisanship tends to matter most to those who are politically knowledgeable (e.g., Zaller, 1992 ). In terms of a possible mechanism, although this analysis did not provide a direct test, one answer may be provided by recent coverage of the Supreme Court, much of which has emphasized the polarized pattern of important rulings. Such news coverage paints the portrait of the Court as a partisan institution, a pattern that may in turn highlight for more knowledgeable respondents the importance of politics in the selection of Court nominees. This would be a mechanism in line with papers such as Johnston and Bartels (2010) , which find that exposure to more "sensationalist"
Supreme Court media coverage lessen respondents' overall support of the Court. However, more research is needed to evaluate the nature of the cues received by the public about the Supreme Court.
Lastly, although partisanship is one of the most important characteristics across all sorts of assessments, the findings also reveal a significant difference between support for, or trust in, a nominee versus a belief that the candidate is qualified. These discrepancies in turn suggests caution for scholars of public opinion: simply asking respondents which candidates they think are "qualified, " as is often done (not just by scholars, but also by polls), could mask deep ideological divides. These di-vides could ultimately explain strong or weak overall enthusiasm for even highly qualified candidates.
Candidates like Merrick Garland or Samuel Alito may be considered extremely qualified by members of the public, but this need not correspond to support.
Concluding Remarks
The contributions of this analysis are threefold. First, this analysis aids our understanding of how people in the real world evaluate Supreme Court candidates by linking discrete professional, partisan, and personal characteristics to public support. Of course, only the most highly qualified candidates are selected to be Supreme Court nominees, and these individuals are usually introduced to the public solely on the basis of their professional and personal characteristics-and not on the basis of their partisan leanings, which actually do serve to predict eventual Supreme Court votes.
As this analysis shows, however, people from across the political spectrum strongly prefer Supreme
Court candidates politically closer to themselves and oppose candidates who are politically distant.
This emphasis on partisanship would help explain strongly polarized responses to candidates like Merrick Garland, who, although by all accounts highly qualified, nonetheless engendered significant partisan responses-not just from elites, but also from members of the public. Looking at other nominations, we would expect that, even among the highly elite potential pool of federal court candidates, partisanship will strongly shape whether members of the public support Supreme Court nominations.
Second, and relatedly, these findings serve to link the literature on the Supreme Court with other literatures in American politics, which have documented that partisanship is an important frameperhaps the most important frame-through which people form attitudes about policies and political
candidates. This suggests that the Court, although in the past viewed as more non-partisan institution, may be instead, and perhaps increasingly, viewed as a fundamentally political branch, more in line with other political bodies. However, a fruitful area of further research would compare these findings with the relative importance of partisan proximity in the selection of, for example, elected officials.
Other research might look to how expectations over ideology or legal philosophy, as opposed to party signals (examined here), shapes public expectations. Further research might examine these questions by looking at the relationship between candidate characteristics and both ideology and voting on certain issues. For example, do respondents tend to infer that female candidates will be more likely to favor reproductive rights? Or, do respondents tend to infer that Catholic candidates will be less likely to favor reproductive rights? How do these factors increase or decrease respondent support?
Finally, these points raise substantial implications for our current methods of choosing Supreme Court candidates. As noted, the public often has at best limited information about a potential candidates' political and ideological beliefs, with most dialogue surrounding Supreme Court nominees purposely focusing on demographic characteristics or professional experience. Although the identity of the appointing President can provide a starting point for a candidate's political leanings, candidates throughout the course of confirmation hearings can successfully avoid expressing their views on important political and legal topics. So much evasion happens at these confirmation hearings that Elena
Kagan, in her time before the Court, wrote "the confirmation process takes on an air of vacuity and farce, and the Senate becomes incapable of either properly evaluating nominees or appropriately educating the public" (Kagan, 1995) .
This analysis suggests, however, that Americans wish to have more information than this. Americans do rely on pedigree and experience, particularly in assessing candidate qualifications, but, beyond a baseline level of competence, partisanship is the main predictor of support of, and trust in, a potential candidate. In the absence of such information, Americans may simply turn to other cuescues which are often noisy, inaccurate, or perhaps implicitly biased. Thus, when it comes to potential candidates for the Supreme Court, the public may be better served by a more transparent processone that acknowledges political and ideological leanings much more openly. 
A Online Supplemental Appendix

A.1 Screenshots of the Conjoint Experiment
The following are magnified screen shots of what the respondents viewed at each stage of the conjoint survey.
The first screen included the simple instructions:
The second screen included the conjoint question itself, with the characteristics (1) randomly rotated in order in the table and (2) randomly assigned.
This information was followed by the three questions on (1) qualifications, (2) trust, and (3) support.
A.2 Knowledge Questions
Note: Both question order and order of possible answers were randomly ordered.
• • If the U.S. Supreme Court started making a lot of decisions that most people disagree with, it might be better to do away with the Supreme Court altogether.
-Strongly Agree • The U.S. Supreme Court has become too independent and should be reigned in.
- Table A .4: Linear probability models for higher values of (1) support, (2) attitudes on qualification, and (3) trust. Sample includes all respondents receiving partisan prompts (n = 886). Models (1), (2), and (3) include interactions between co-partisanship and high legitimacy; models (4), (5), and (6) include interactions between co-partisanship and high levels of knowledge. Other characteristics from conjoint included in model but not shown. SEs clustered at respondent level. Table A .5: Linear probability estimates for higher values of (1) support, (2) attitudes on qualification, and (3) trust. Sample includes all respondents receiving partisan prompts (n = 886). Models (1), (3), and (3) include all conjoint profiles shown; models (2), (4), and (6) include only "highly qualified" conjoint profiles. Other characteristics from conjoint included in model but not shown. SEs clustered at respondent level. Figure A .3: Results for respondent's feelings of (1) overall level of support, (2) sentiments on level of qualification, and (3) how much they would trust the potential candidate. Estimates generated via linear probability model with high levels of support, qualifications, and trust as the outcome variables. Sample includes all respondents not receiving partisan prompts (n = 764). SEs clustered at respondent level.
